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Duplicate Health Insurance Coverage: 
Determinants of Variation Across 
States 
by Harold S. Luft and Susan C. Maerki 
Although it is recognized that many people have duplicate 
private health insurance coverage, either through separate 
purchase or as health benefits in multi-earner families, there 
has been little analysis of the factors determining duplicate 
coverage rates. A new data source, the Survey of Income and 
Education, offers a comparison with the only previous source 
of state level data, the estimates from the Health Insurance 
Association of America. The R2 between the two sets is only 
.3 and certain problems can be traced to the methodology un-
derlying the HIAA figures. 
Using figures for gross and net coverage, the ratio of total 
policies to people with private coverage ranges from .94 in 
Utah to 1.53 in Illinois. Measures of industry distribution, per 
capita income and employment explain a large portion of the 
variance, but it appears that these factors operate in opposite 
directions for group and non-group policies. Similar socio-
demographic variables also explain net coverage. These find-
ings have substantial implications for research and the struc-
turing of employee health benefits. 
Introduction 
In the early days of health insurance, coverage un-
der multiple policies was a source of concern to the 
industry because some people collected more than 
their expenditures and therefore "made money" by 
being hospitalized (Andersen and Riedel, 1967; Fer-
ber, 1966; Luck, 1963). With the development of coor-
dination-of-benefits clauses and the dominance of 
group enrollment, the inappropriate incentives to con-
sume medical care because of duplicate coverage, or 
"overinsurance," have become less of an issue. How-
ever, duplicate coverage continues to exist and its 
This research has been supported by grant 18-P-97556/9-01 
from the Health Care Financing Administration. 
presence has important implications beyond the is-
sue of "overinsurance," both for public policy and for 
research on the medical care system.1 
1Luck distinguishes between "multiple coverage," "dupli-
cate coverage," and "overinsurance." 
. . . multiple coverage refers to coverage for the 
same or different services by more than one contract 
when the contracts are explicitly intended to supple-
ment one another in terms of either services or 
benefits . . . Duplicate coverage takes place when 
coverage is provided by more than one contract for 
the same service, usually a major category of serv-
ice, e.g., hospital care or physician's services. Multi-
ple coverage, and more especially duplicate cover-
age, may result in overinsurance, defined here as the 
receipt of benefits exceeding 100 percent of the to-
tal charges... 
For our purposes, multiple and duplicate insurance will be 
used interchangeably because we are referring to the statis-
tics on hospitalization insurance. Most major policies pro-
vide a similar range of benefits for hospitalization, and cover-
age by more than one contract is almost sure to provide 
duplicate coverage. Furthermore, our primary concern is with 
the use of enrollment data for the analysis of hospital utiliza-
tion, rather than for the allocation of expenditures or bene-
fits. If plans offering only partial coverage because of exclu-
sions or coordination of benefits counted enrollees in pro-
portion to their coverage, much of our concern would disap-
pear. 
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Coverage by more than one policy occurs in a num-
ber of situations. 
• The most frequent example, recognized in the 
earliest studies of the issue (Andersen and Rie-
del, 1967; Ferber, 1966; Luck, 1963), occurs when 
two or more people in the family are working and 
at least one of them has family coverage. 
• Others purchase additional policies outside of 
the employer group, policies termed individual or 
non-group contracts, to supplement the primary 
policy.2 Some may purchase more than one non-
group policy. 
• Less often, multiple coverage results when a per-
son has more than one job, or during the period 
when continuation of benefits from a former em-
ployer overlaps with the coverage obtained from a 
new employer. 
• Administrative "phantom coverage" appears 
when the statistics maintained by the carrier indi-
cate that the total number of people enrolled in 
the plan exceed the number actually eligible. 
Lags in tabulating employee turnover and inaccu-
rate estimates of family size on family contracts 
are two sources of this phantom coverage. It 
should be noted that such phantom coverage im-
plies the appearance, rather than the reality of 
duplicate coverage, and it is difficult and very 
costly to maintain accurate figures on enrollment. 
• Various changes in the occupational mix, em-
ployee fringe benefits, family structure, and labor 
force participation of married women have result-
ed in a substantial increase in duplicate coverage 
over the last decade (Luft, 1981). 
Temporal changes in duplicate coverage raise one 
set of issues and problems, but another set arises 
from the recognition that multiple insurance policies 
are not randomly distributed across the population. 
There are important geographic, occupational, and 
demographic factors that influence the extent of 
duplicate coverage. Recognition of these factors has 
direct policy relevance and substantial implications 
for researchers using estimates of health insurance 
coverage. 
This paper is not intended to be a comprehensive 
analysis of the duplicate coverage issue. It is an out-
growth of a study that required estimates of hospitali-
zation insurance coverage by state as one of many in-
dependent variables (Luft, 1979). In the process of ex-
amining these data, numerical inconsistencies and 
methodological problems led to an examination of 
duplicate health insurance coverage. The apparent 
ramifications of the issue extend well beyond the 
original research project. 
2To avoid the confusing term "individual policy," we will 
refer to single and family policies that may be obtained 
either through group or non-group purchasing arrangements. 
The first section of this paper discusses alternative 
estimates of gross and net insurance coverage and 
the derivation of the duplicate coverage figures. The 
second section offers an initial exploration of factors 
that may explain variations across states in the dupli-
cate coverage rate, although much more work beyond 
the scope of this paper must be done to understand 
the complexities of duplicate coverage. In the third 
section, we focus on estimating net health insurance 
coverage by state as a function of other readily avail-
able factors. This allows us to generate a consistent 
set of net health insurance coverage data for the peri-
od 1953-76. The final two sections address implica-
tions for research and for policy. 
Alternate Estimates of Health Insurance 
Coverage 
Duplicate coverage rates involve a denominator 
which is the number of people covered by insurance, 
or net enrollment, and a numerator which represents 
duplication. For analytic studies of why people have 
multiple policies, the numerator would be the number 
of people with two, three, or more policies covering 
them. For aggregate studies of utilization, an alterna-
tive measure is a numerator that is gross enrollment, 
the total number of enrollees in all health insurance 
plans, without any adjustment for duplication. Our 
current interest in utilization statistics and the limited 
availability of data restrict this paper to an analysis of 
the latter measure, the ratio of gross to net enroll-
ment. 
Gross Enrollment 
Gross enrollment data may be obtained in two 
ways: (1) from household surveys that ask people 
whether they are covered, and exactly how many poli-
cies they hold; and (2) from enrollment reports of in-
surance carriers and health plans. Although the feder-
al government and many researchers have used sur-
vey results for many years, one of the major criti-
cisms of such data is that people may underreport 
coverage (Reed, 1965). It is even more likely they will 
underreport the number of multiple policies. More-
over, surveys are expensive to mount and rarely pro-
vide data for areas smaller than major Census re-
gions. Gross enrollment statistics from insurance car-
riers, however, are compiled regularly by the Health 
Insurance Association of America (HIAA) using data 
from commercial insurance companies, Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services estimates of enrollment in HMOs 
and other independent plans. Adjustments to these 
statistics serve as the basis for the HIAA estimates of 
net coverage by state, which have been published 
since 1948. (See annual issues of Source Book of 
Health Insurance Data published by the Health Insur-
ance Institute for HIAA.) 
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Net Enrollment 
Because net enrollment statistics must identify 
those people with coverage, regardless of the number 
of policies, survey data are often preferred even 
though there is potential underreporting.3 Household-
based estimates of the covered population have been 
developed at irregular intervals since the early 1950s 
(Andersen and Anderson, 1967; Anderson and Feld-
man, 1956; Anderson, Collette, and Feldman, 1963; 
Andersen, Lion, and Anderson, 1976; Kovar, 1960; U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1978; U.S. National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS), 1965; U.S. NCHS, 1972; U.S. 
NCHS, 1976; U.S. NCHS, 1977; U.S. NCHS, 1979). With 
the exception of the 1976 Survey of Income and Edu-
cation, these surveys do not provide coverage esti-
mates at the state level, but only at the four major 
Census regions (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978).4 
The Health Insurance Association of America 
derives estimates of net coverage based on its gross 
enrollment statistics. (This derivation is described in 
the next section.) These are the only state data avail-
able over an extended period of time. Thus, they have 
been used in numerous analytic studies, many of 
which have had a substantial impact on our views of 
the medical care system (Feldstein, 1971; Feldstein 
and Taylor, 1977; Fuchs and Kramer, 1972; Goldberg 
and Greenberg, 1977; Rosenthal, 1964). However, our 
current analysis raises serious questions about the 
validity of the HIAA net enrollment data. 
From Gross to Net Enrollment 
The first and most important problem with the data 
stems from the methods used by the HIAA to derive 
net coverage from gross enrollment. National and 
state totals for gross coverage are calculated for each 
category of insurance—Commercial Group; Commer-
cial Individual (or non-group); Blue Cross/Blue Shield; 
and Other (which includes prepaid plans). Each of 
these are then multiplied by a separate duplicate cov-
erage factor estimated from a periodic one-day survey 
of insurance claims.5 Even when taken at face value, 
these must be regarded cautiously because subscrib-
ers submitting claims may not represent the entire in-
sured population. If a sample of claimants is older or 
sicker and over-representative of individuals who pur-
chase additional coverage in anticipation of higher 
utilization, the factor will overestimate duplicate cov-
erage. Conversely, an individual with multiple policies 
3One may argue, however, that if people really do not know 
they have coverage, their behavior is not influenced by po-
tential, but unused insurance benefits. 
4The National Health Interview Survey data tape can be 
used to provide coverage rates for selected metropolitan 
areas. 
5The current factors are based on a 1973 survey. Group 
surveys were also conducted in 1967 and 1977, and these do 
not suggest a need for changes from the factors based on 
the 1973 survey (Thexton, 1981). 
might stagger submitting claims to reduce the likeli-
hood that the other insurance company will discover 
the duplication and coordinate payments. When pay-
ments are made directly to the subscriber rather than 
to the physician or hospital, total payments would 
cover a larger proportion of the total bill or may even 
produce a "profit".6 Potential double payments create 
an incentive to understate multiple coverage on 
claims forms, and this will reduce the estimated 
duplicate coverage rate. In recognition of these po-
tential biases, the HIAA adds an upward adjustment 
to the duplicate coverage estimates derived from the 
sample survey. 
The final HIAA national estimates of net enrollment 
derived from this process are consistently above 
those of survey estimates. It is clear that the respec-
tive methodologies bias up the HIAA figures and bias 
down the survey figures, and the true figure is be-
tween these two (Anderson and Feldman, 1965; Car-
roll, 1978; Reed, 1965). It should be noted; however, 
that when the HIAA has revised its estimates, it has 
been usually downward, which suggests that the sur-
vey figures are probably more accurate (Luft, 1981; 
Reed, 1967). Although we will use survey estimates as 
our benchmark for net coverage, it is a trivial matter 
to adjust them to whatever alternative data one feels 
is more appropriate. 
The major difficulty with the HIAA procedure oc-
curs in the estimation of net enrollment at a state 
level. The net coverage multipliers developed at a na-
tional level are applied to the gross enrollments by 
type of coverage in each state. For instance, in recent 
years the national equation has been: 
Net Enrollment = (0.85 x Commercial 
Group) + (0.40 x Commercial Nongroup) 
+ (0.95 x BC/BS) + (0.99 x Other) 
This implies that only 40% of commercial non-group 
policies are nonduplicative and represent uncovered 
people. Applying the same set of coefficients to all 
states ignores the fact that some states may have low 
rates of group enrollment, with non-group policies as 
the major source of coverage, while other states have 
high rates of group enrollment, so non-group cover-
age is almost always duplicative. Unfortunately, with-
out an independent source of coverage data at the 
state level, such as the Survey of Income and Educa-
tion (SIE), there was no way that the HIAA or an inde-
pendent researcher could determine the extent of this 
problem. Our comparison indicates, based on the SIE 
data, major discrepancies attributable to the HIAA 
procedure. Even without the SIE data, it is clear that 
the assumption of uniform duplication rates across 
states is incorrect because the procedure results in 
net estimates that exceed several states' population. 
6Studies in the 1960s indicated this to be a problem 
among those with multiple policies (Ferber, 1966). Coordina-
tion of benefits among insurers has improved, and it is less 
likely now that a person with more than one policy will re-
ceive an overpayment. 
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Employment vs. Residence-Based Data 
This leads to consideration of the second major 
problem: the likelihood that the data refer to place of 
employment rather than place of residence. Since the 
gross coverage data are obtained from carriers, rather 
than enrollees, it is almost certain that statistics for 
persons with group coverage are reported by the loca-
tion of the group, i.e., the employer, and that cover-
age for persons with non-group policies reflect resi-
dence. Until the 1973 report, the HIAA state coverage 
figures identified the data as employment-based. 
From 1974 to 1978 the footnote indicates the "esti-
mated distribution by states reflects coverage by resi-
dence rather than employment." The 1978-79 hand-
book correctly identifies the data as an "estimated 
distribution by states [which] essentially reflects cov-
erage by employment rather than residence with ad-
justment to take into account the population of the 
states." In fact, the only major change in methods oc-
curred in 1973 when it was recognized that, for some 
states, the estimated number of persons under age 65 
with private insurance exceeded the under age 65 
population. Although this had long been the case for 
Washington, D.C., the role of commuters from Mary-
land and Virginia was assumed to explain the discrep-
ancy. The HIAA took the stance that their national 
estimates of net enrollment were correct, necessitat-
ing reallocation of the state estimates. The current 
procedure compares the estimated net enrollment in 
each state to the civilian non-institutionalized under 
age 65 population in that state. If net enrollment ex-
ceeds 98 percent of the relevant population, the esti-
mate is arbitrarily set at the 98 percent value. The re-
sidual is reallocated among those states with less 
than 98 percent coverage in proportion to their enroll-
ment. Thus, 9.3 percent of the excess coverage in 
Massachusetts is reallocated to California. Several 
passes are often required before all states fall at or 
below the "98 percent limit." The use of an arbitrary 
upper limit is questionable, and the reallocation to all 
states, rather than neighboring states, which might 
reflect commuting patterns, compounds the problem. 
Unfortunately, the HIAA has not had any better data 
from which to make its adjustments. 
While there are severe problems with the HIAA net 
coverage figures, the gross enrollment data are rea-
sonably accurate, with one important exception. The 
exception stems from the fact that the group enroll-
ment reflects place of employment rather than resi-
dence. Since residence-based data are more useful 
for most analytic purposes, we reallocated the group 
enrollment data from place of employment to place of 
residence. Group enrollment, in this case, refers to 
commercial group coverage, group coverage under 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield/medical society plans, and 
"Other Plans," such as HMO's, union, and employer-
employee plans.7 The reallocation was accomplished 
by using a commute-to-work matrix developed by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (1979). This 51 by 51 matrix indicating 
the number of people by state of residence and state 
of employment was developed by matching employer-
based FICA tax returns with the place of residence 
listed on individual income tax returns. Not surpris-
ingly, most people live and work in the same state, 
and out-of-state commuting is much more prevalent 
in the Northeast than in the West.8 
Non-group enrollments were not reallocated on the 
assumption that most of these policies would be re-
ported from the place of residence. The sum of the 
HIAA non-group and the reallocated group enroll-
ments yield an estimate of residence-based gross en-
rollment. 
Comparing HIAA and Survey Estimates 
of Net Coverage by State 
Because most people live and work in the same 
state, the residence-based gross enrollments are simi-
lar to the raw figures provided by the HIAA. (The R2 
between the two sets of data, in terms of poli-
cies/capita, is .966.) Given this result can we assume 
that the HIAA net figures are also close to the mark? 
Unfortunately, this is not a correct assumption. 
The 1976 Survey of Income and Education is a 
household survey of sufficiently large magnitude to 
provide reasonably reliable state estimate data, in-
cluding health insurance coverage (U.S. Bureau of the 
7These data were provided by the HIAA. The annual 
sourcebooks only include net enrollments by state after ap-
plication of the "98 percent rule" rather than gross enroll-
ments by type of coverage. All our data refer to hospital in-
surance coverage. Group coverage for Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield plans was drawn from the 1977 Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield Fact Book and personal correspondence with those 
Blue Shield plans providing both hospital and medical cover-
age. 
8Although the matrix is conceptually 51 x 51, the Dept. of 
Commerce only makes available a table showing up to ten 
states of employment for each state of residence with all 
other "commuters" lumped together. In no case was the 
"other" category more than 0.5 percent. 
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Census, 1979). We have used the figures for persons 
under the age of 65 who are covered by one or more 
private health insurance plans. Those who were cov-
ered under both private and public plans are includ-
ed.9 People with public coverage only were exclud-
ed.10 Overall, the SIE indicates that 75 percent of the 
under 65 population had private coverage, a figure 
close to those reported by other surveys for the same 
period (U.S. NCHS, 1979; Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, 1978). The potential undercounting bias 
in surveys exists in the SIE, but there is no reason to 
think it would have differential impacts across states. 
Figure 1 presents a plot of the proportion of the 
civilian population under age 65 with coverage as 
based on the SIE and the HIAA net enrollment fig-
ures. A scatter of points along the 45° line would in-
dicate close agreement between the two sources. Al-
ternatively, the points might fail along a line above or 
below the diagonal, indicating consistent under or 
over estimation by the SIE. Instead, the points create 
a diffuse "cloud," and the regression of HIAA cover-
age on SIE yields an R2 of only .3. Part of these dis-
tressing results are directly attributable to the 98 per-
cent rule, as can be seen by the line of states at the 
98 percent coverage level. More importantly, this dis-
crepancy is evidence that duplicate coverage is not 
uniform across states. 
An easy solution for someone requiring estimates 
of the covered population by state in 1976 is to use 
the SIE rather than the HIAA figures. For those inter-
ested in earlier periods, however, state-specific sur-
vey data are not available; nor, considering the cost 
of such surveys, is the SIE likely to be repeated often. 
The development of an approach for estimating net 
coverage by state as a function of other, more readily 
available data, is presented later in the paper. Recog-
nizing that duplicate coverage varies across states 
raises the question: is it possible to explain why such 
variation occurs? 
9 The vast majority of people with both public and private 
coverage are 65 and over. For the under 65 population, those 
with both public and private coverage total 3 percent of the 
population with private coverage. The SIE question referred 
to health insurance plans "designed to pay all or part of the 
hospital, and/or doctor, surgeon or other medical expenses." 
It specifically excludes accident and disability income insur-
ance (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976). 
10Public coverage includes Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans 
Administration and coverage by the Civilian Health and Medi-
cal Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) for civil-
ian dependents of members of the Armed Forces. 
State Variations in the Duplicate Coverage Rate 
Table 1 presents estimates of per capita coverage 
using HIAA gross, HIAA net and SIE net divided by 
the civilian under 65 population and the group, non-
group and overall duplication rate, which is defined 
as the relevant gross HIAA coverage divided by SIE.11 
These figures indicate an overall duplicate coverage 
rate of 1.23, ranging from .94 in Utah to 1.53 in Illi-
nois. In fact, Utah is the only state in which the sur-
vey estimate exceeds the HIAA estimate and this may 
reflect either random sampling error or the omission 
of one or two carriers whose business is concentrat-
ed in Utah. 
Several factors are likely to influence the duplicate 
coverage rate. Since most health insurance is ob-
tained through employment groups, duplication is 
probably dependent on the likelihood that several 
workers in a family have group coverage through em-
ployment and cover each other and their children. 
Clearly, the duplication rate should be positively re-
lated to the number of workers in a family. Employ-
ment-based coverage is also more likely for people in 
unions and union plans typically have more compre-
hensive benefits. Those who work full time are more 
likely to have coverage than part-time workers. There 
are also marked differences in private health insur-
ance coverage by industry, ranging from 94 percent in 
durable manufacturing to 74 percent in personal serv-
ices (Congresssional Budget Office, 1979). Finally, 
employer contributions for coverage of dependents 
also vary by industry and income.12 The larger the em-
ployer contribution, the greater the likelihood that 
everyone in the family is automatically covered and 
that additional earners result in duplication. Clearly, 
many of these factors are interrelated and a multiple 
regression model is necessary to estimate their net 
effects on duplication. 
11Theoretically, a distinction exists between additional 
health insurance policies which provide benefits to supple-
ment services or payments included in the primary plan and 
additional policies which provide similar or overlapping bene-
fits. Without the detailed examination of plan benefits such 
as provided by the National Medical Care Expenditure Survey 
(forthcoming), we cannot distinguish types of duplication 
and thus must rely on the ratio of gross to net enrollments. 
One may also define the duplication rate in other ways, such 
as the ratio of (gross-net enrollment)/net enrollment. Because 
our primary interest was in a ratio to adjust existing enroll-
ment statistics, we chose to use gross/net enrollment. 
12The exclusion of fringe benefits from taxable income 
makes employer contributions for health insurance more 
valuable as income rises. For example, see the discussion in 
Greene (1980), Mitchell and Vogel (1975) or Steurle and Hoff-
man (1979). 
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FIGURE 1 
Percentage of Each State's Population Under Age 65 
with Private Insurance — 1976 
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TABLE 1 
Values of the Health Insurance Coverage Estimates Used in the Analysis 
State 
AL 
AK 
AR 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MA 
Ml 
MN 
MS 
MO 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
Rl 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
WA 
WV 
Wl 
WY 
VT 
DMV 
GRSPC65 
.85870 
.64912 
.75296 
.70258 
.87159 
.92991 
1.17499 
.99792 
.81497 
.84895 
.82282 
.86915 
1.22758 
1.18987 
1.07162 
.91453 
.92312 
.79401 
.87479 
1.06862 
1.06542 
.98751 
.76268 
1.17694 
.95413 
1.03212 
.91855 
1.10815 
1.12465 
.83135 
1.17683 
.94911 
.98737 
1.16866 
.76669 
.88533 
1.14684 
1.07659 
.95908 
.81900 
.99511 
.88546 
.78162 
.88977 
.99419 
1.11294 
1.01064 
.98514 
1.00771 
HIAAPC65 
0.71127 
0.65915 
0.63132 
0.65606 
0.78603 
0.80993 
0.98051 
0.94906 
0.65595 
0.71967 
0.78762 
0.69016 
0.99082 
1.00461 
0.90259 
0.73831 
0.78772 
0.65966 
0.78602 
0.99198 
0.96751 
0.82777 
0.58405 
0.98084 
0.78761 
0.84207 
0.70141 
0.90625 
0.95772 
0.66976 
0.87226 
0.77556 
0.86316 
0.99156 
0.62660 
0.79553 
0.99885 
1.00000 
0.78925 
0.61000 
0.85427 
0.74996 
0.69305 
0.80624 
0.80643 
0.88916 
0.81232 
0.84434 
0.97428 
SIEPC65 
0.767728 
0.604261 
0.712561 
0.715209 
0.719428 
0.778871 
0.867809 
0.817925 
0.754816 
0.741202 
0.715898 
0.756649 
0.801507 
0.861593 
0.876248 
0.822488 
0.739647 
0.688807 
0.776165 
0.831905 
0.846920 
0.844368 
0.684758 
0.784315 
0.768879 
0.839779 
0.753887 
0.821332 
0.836790 
0.625788 
0.784174 
0.780768 
0.788421 
0.844094 
0.718032 
0.775571 
0.822622 
0.814024 
0.740653 
0.794333 
0.770193 
0.692644 
0.834916 
0.751731 
0.777489 
0.877979 
0.761345 
0.787736 
0.749689 
GRPDRT 
0.91350 
1.00373 
0.80865 
0.92225 
1.12198 
1.03376 
1.22674 
1.12544 
0.80872 
1.02356 
1.07815 
0.88682 
1.27680 
1.25545 
0.93274 
0.91231 
1.05336 
0.90938 
0.91550 
1.16744 
1.15276 
0.95711 
0.76362 
1.15529 
0.92244 
0.93205 
0.98573 
1.07792 
1.15394 
1.08095 
1.36119 
0.90409 
0.98525 
1.25864 
0.85161 
1.00877 
1.22740 
1.22217 
1.03886 
0.68705 
1.02383 
1.05812 
0.82239 
1.07222 
0.97006 
0.92513 
0.93000 
0.90626 
1.16382 
NGRPDRT 
0.204993 
0.070510 
0.248016 
0.175817 
0.089418 
0.160148 
0.127251 
0.094579 
0.270974 
0.121814 
0.071199 
0.261863 
0.254785 
0.125554 
0.290205 
0.199613 
0.194719 
0.243339 
0.211546 
0.117102 
0.105241 
0.212414 
0.350184 
0.345312 
0.318435 
0.297917 
0.149988 
0.271299 
0.190084 
0.247554 
0.139539 
0.311530 
0.267023 
0.125875 
0.216157 
0.132757 
0.166729 
0.100375 
0.256038 
0.344104 
0.268191 
0.220245 
0.113768 
0.111403 
0.308622 
0.342502 
0.397351 
0.344311 
0.180347 
PRVTDRT 
1.11849 
1.07424 
1.05667 
1.09807 
1.21150 
1.19391 
1.35399 
1.22002 
1.07969 
1.14538 
1.14935 
1.14869 
1.53158 
1.38101 
1.22295 
1.11192 
1.24808 
1.15272 
1.12705 
1.28454 
1.25800 
1.16952 
1.11380 
1.50060 
1.24087 
1.22997 
1.21842 
1.34922 
1.34402 
1.32850 
1.50073 
1.21562 
1.25228 
1.38451 
1.06777 
1.14153 
1.39413 
1.32254 
1.29490 
1.03115 
1.29202 
1.27837 
0.93616 
1.18362 
1.27868 
1.26763 
1.32735 
1.25057 
1.34417 
GRSPC65 = HIAA Gross Coverage/Population Under 65 
HIAAPC65 = Original HIAA Net Coverage/Population Under 65 
SIEPC65 = SIE Net Coverage/Population Under 65 
GRPDPRT = HIAA Gross Group Coverage/SIE Net Coverage 
NGRPDRT = HIAA Gross Non-Group Coverage/SIE Net Coverage 
PRVTDRT = HIAA Gross Coverage/SIE Net Coverage 
DMV = District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia 
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In addition to these general factors, specific as-
pects of the health insurance market may influence 
the duplication rate. Many carriers do not maintain 
up-to-date lists of eligible enrollees and, instead, 
check eligibility with the employer only when a claim 
is filed. When turnover rates are high, carrier-based 
enrollment files will include a significant number of 
"phantom enrollees" (U.S. Senate, 1951), although 
some duplicate coverage among the unemployed is 
attributable to continuation-of-benefits clauses in 
contracts (Lee, 1979; Price, 1976). In a few areas, car-
riers work with employers to avoid duplicate cov-
erage. Such activities may be more effective when a 
single carrier, such as Blue Cross, has a dominant 
share of the market. Finally, duplicate coverage under 
conventional plans with coordination-of-benefits 
offers the enrollee the possibility of having co-pay-
ments covered. Because most HMO's have no co-pay-
ments and will not honor claims for non-emergency 
out-of-plan use, we expect that duplicate coverage in-
volving HMOs is less attractive than duplicate con-
ventional coverage.13 This is supported by evidence 
from California that 14.5 percent of HMO enrollees 
have other health insurance coverage in contrast to 
17 percent among those with other private insurance 
(Blumberg, 1980). 
Estimation of the Model 
Most of the theoretical variables can be straightfor-
wardly identified in published data from the SIE and 
decennial census. This includes an industry distribu-
tion of the employed civilian labor force, the male un-
employment rate, the number of earners per family, 
the percentage of working wives, and percent of 
workers who work full-time all year. Per capita income 
figures by state were prepared by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (1979). To reflect the regional varia-
tions in prices, these figures were adjusted following 
the method outlined by Fuchs, Michael and Scott 
(1979). Information on union membership is from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1979).14 In our regressions, 
observations for Washington, D.C., Maryland and Vir-
ginia are combined as one state. Therefore, each re-
gression is based on a total of 49 observations. 
Attempts to explain the overall duplicate coverage 
rate were only moderately successful. Ordinary least 
squares regression results produced corrected R2 
values of .38 to .40. Full-time employment was the 
only variable consistently significant in all formula-
tions. More importantly, contrary to expectations, 
neither income nor earners per family were sig-
nificant. 
13An exception occurs when an HMO member is offered 
duplicate conventional coverage at no cost. Then the addi-
tional policy can be used as a backup for "second opinions." 
14Unpublished data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in-
clude union membership for Washington, D.C., with the 
Maryland data. 
Suspecting that the reasons for purchasing group 
and individual health insurance may differ, separate 
group and non-group duplicate enrollment rates were 
approximated by using the residence-based group in-
surance enrollment as one numerator and non-group 
enrollment as the other. SIE estimates of private in-
surance coverage for those under 65 remained the de-
nominator.15 The sum of these two ratios yields the 
overall duplicate coverage rate. 
Group Duplicate Coverage Rate 
Estimates for alternative forms of the group dupli-
cate coverage equation are provided in Table 2. The 
first equation, with seven variables, explains nearly 70 
percent of the variation in group coverage across 
states. As expected, the proportion of full-time year-
round workers, real per capita income, earners per 
family, and unionization are all positively related to 
group coverage. Reflecting "phantom coverage" and 
health benefits for laid-off workers, the male unem-
ployment rate is positive and highly significant. The 
male unemployment rate was chosen as the better 
measure of turnover differentials; the overall unem-
ployment rate is often dominated by teenagers and 
women newly entering the labor force—neither group 
is as likely to generate "phantom coverage." The 
HMO market share is negatively related to duplicate 
coverage.16 The second equation indicates that a 
larger Blue Cross market share does not reduce the 
duplication rate. In fact, it is positive, but insignifi-
cant. 
At first glance, one might expect the proportion of 
wives who are working to be a good measure of dupli-
cate coverage, but as equation III indicates, it is in-
ferior to the number of earners per family. This is 
probably because some married women with husband 
present are working because their husbands are dis-
abled, unemployed, or otherwise not working and in-
eligible for health insurance. Thus, while the increas-
ing proportion of working wives is probably one of 
the major reasons for duplicate coverage, the number 
of earners per family is a more sensitive measure.17 
15One might prefer other dependent variables for different 
problems. For instance, net group coverage or net individual 
coverage per capita could be used for marketing analyses, 
while the ratio of group policies to group covered persons 
might be used for studies of benefit coordination. The pub-
lished SIE data, however, do not break out source of cov-
erage (group vs. non-group), so such studies must await 
further work. 
16This variable is defined as total HMO enrollment divided 
by gross enrollment in all plans. 
17In 1976, the husband was a non-earner in 7.2 percent of 
husband-wife families with the wife working (Johnson and 
Hayghe, 1977). 
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TABLE 2 
Group Coverage, 1976 
(Dependent Variable is Gross Group Hospital Insurance Enrollment/Net Private Enrollment) 
Unemployment Rate 
% Durable Manufacturing 
% Full-Time Employed 
Income per capita (real) 
Earners per family 
% Union 
% HMO 
% Blue Cross 
% Wife working 
% Mining 
% Agriculture 
Income per capita (nominal) 
Constant 
R2 (Corrected) 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
I 
1.935** 
(.718) 
.923** 
(.244) 
2.026** 
(.431) 
.047* 
(.021) 
.275* 
(.123) 
.705** 
(.168) 
.683* 
(.320) 
1.359 
.691 
II 
1.775* 
(.749) 
.869** 
(.255) 
1.999** 
(.435) 
.049* 
(.021) 
.233 
(.135) 
.686** 
(.170) 
.669* 
(.322) 
.080 
(.102) 
1.293 
.689 
III 
1.304 
(.734) 
.799** 
(.254) 
1.771** 
(.435) 
.055* 
(.022) 
.797** 
(.185) 
.694* 
(.342) 
.317 
(.324) 
.908 
.662 
IV 
2.194* 
(1.069) 
1.039** 
(.339) 
2.162** 
(.510) 
.050* 
(.023) 
.311* 
(.138) 
.651** 
(.191) 
.653 
(.333) 
.570 
(.915) 
.055 
(.414) 
1.544 
.679 
V 
1.656* 
(.820) 
.872** 
(.252) 
1.867** 
(.451) 
.234 
(.147) 
.616** 
(.198) 
.443 
(.326) 
.027 
(.020) 
1.017 
.669 
Non-Group Coverage 
Health insurance coverage is generally purchased 
on a non-group basis either when employer-group 
coverage is not available or to supplement group poli-
cies. In both instances, one would expect the primary 
determinants to be the complements of the variables 
explaining group coverage. As indicated in Table 3, 
two of the variables positively related to group cov-
erage, per capita income and unionization, are nega-
tively associated with non-group duplication. 
Although not significant, the unemployment rate is 
also negative in the non-group equations. Among the 
industry variables, mining and agriculture are positive-
ly related to non-group coverage and public adminis-
tration is negatively related. The strong association 
with mining is surprising since over 90% of employed 
miners have some form of private insurance, most of 
them with group coverage. Perhaps the recognized 
health risks of that industry induce more workers to 
purchase additional non-group policies. Or, more in-
directly, mining might capture the attributes of a 
sparsely distributed population. The non-miners in 
small towns with few large employers may purchase 
health insurance on a non-group basis. Finally, the 
historic commitment to community rating by Blue 
Cross plans leads to the expectation that non-group 
coverage might be more available in areas with large 
Blue Cross market shares. Instead, the Blue Cross 
variable is negative, albeit insignificant. 
Estimating Net Insurance Coverage by State 
The preceding section examined reasons for dupli-
cate health insurance coverage and how such cov-
erage varies across states. For interpreting utilization 
levels, knowing the extent of duplicate coverage is 
important. For other purposes, one needs to know the 
extent of private health insurance coverage and why 
coverage rates vary across states. Unfortunately, SIE 
data pertain only to 1976, so estimates of coverage 
rates for earlier years must be derived from other 
sources. This leads to the twin purposes of this sec-
tion: (1) to understand the factors that determine 
variations in the level of net insurance coverage 
across states and (2) to develop a simple means to 
estimate net coverage levels in years other than 1976. 
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TABLE 3 
Non-Group Coverage, 1976 
(Dependent Variable is Gross Non-Group Hospital Insurance Enrollment/Net Private Enrollment) 
Unemployment rate 
Income per capita (real) 
% Mining 
% Agriculture 
% Public Administration 
% Union 
% Blue Cross 
Constant 
R2 (Corrected) 
*p < .05 
* * p < .01 
I 
.467 
(.695) 
1.502** 
(.504) 
.449 
(.243) 
1.198** 
(.453) 
.264* 
(.117) 
.333 
.483 
II 
.511 
(.685) 
.023 
(.015) 
1.387** 
(.503) 
.438 
(.240) 
.924 
(.483) 
.237* 
(.117) 
.460 
.497 
III 
.024 
(.015) 
1.385** 
(.493) 
.542** 
(.189) 
.956 
(.474) 
.234* 
(.116) 
.063 
(.073) 
.453 
.499 
IV 
.022 
(.015) 
1.533** 
(.462) 
.547** 
(.188) 
.993* 
(.471) 
.266* 
(.109) 
.428 
.502 
Variations in the Extent of Coverage 
Whereas the previous section was concerned with 
the types of group and non-group coverage held by 
people with private health insurance, this section 
focuses on the factors differentiating states with high 
rates of private coverage from those with relatively 
less private coverage. As indicated in Table 1, net pri-
vate coverage ranges from 60 to 87 percent. Net cov-
erage will reflect factors which influence having 
either group or non-group policies, but not necessari-
ly multiple policies. Our exploratory approach first 
tested variables appearing in either equation and then 
added other industry variables. The ratio of military 
personnel to civilians in the state was included as a 
proxy for military dependents who are eligible for gov-
ernment coverage through the CHAMPUS program. 
The importance of military dependents in explaining 
low private coverage rates was first identified in 1962-
1963 (U.S. NCHS, 1967). 
Table 4 presents the regression results for net cov-
erage in 1976. As in the group duplication equations, 
real income and earners per family have positive coef-
ficients. The negative sign for income in the non-
group equations may therefore indicate that low in-
come is associated with the absence of group cov-
erage or, if one has enough money, non-group cov-
erage may be purchased, but many low income 
people have no private coverage. (See U.S. NCHS, 
1980, for other evidence supporting this finding.) The 
positive coefficient for earners suggests that in many 
cases dependents are not covered even though the 
family head may be covered. In fact, more than half of 
the population without coverage who are not in the 
labor force are in families headed by someone with 
coverage (Congressional Budget Office, 1979). The 
three industry variables in the equation have the ex-
pected signs based upon the percentage of coverage 
in each industry nationally. The percentage of military 
personnel in the state is highly significant and has a 
value indicating about 2.3 civilian dependents for 
each person in the service. (Note that active duty per-
sonnel are excluded from the populations used in this 
analysis.) 
The per capita income variable is tested twice, 
once in real and once in nominal terms. In most situa-
tions, real income determines purchasing decisions. 
Yet, the nominal measure is more significant statis-
tically. There are several potential explanations for 
this surprising result. There may be a problem using 
the Laspeyres index devised by Fuchs, Michael and 
Scott (1979) as an adjustment factor to estimate real 
income.18 Another possibility is that certain factors 
associated with areas having high price levels may 
lead to more coverage. (Following this line of reason-
ing, an urbanization variable was added to the equa-
tion.) It may also be the case that nominal, rather 
than real income is, in fact, the determinant of cov-
erage, perhaps because of the implicit subsidy in the 
tax laws. Despite the somewhat better fit given by 
nominal income, we chose to use the real income 
measure until a better explanation can be found for 
the divergent results. Perhaps more importantly, this 
little digression points out the care one must exer-
cise in choosing empirical versions of theoretical 
constructs. 
18This index was compared with the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics cost of living figures for 39 metropolitan areas, and, in 
general, the indices were similar. 
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TABLE 4 
Net Health Insurance Coverage, 1976 
(Dependent Variable is Persons under 65 with Private Coverage/Civilian Population under 65) 
Income per capita (real) 
Earners per family 
% Military 
% Construction 
% Business and 
Repair Service 
Income per capita 
(nominal) 
% Urban 
Unemployment Rate 
% Blue Cross 
% HMO 
% Union 
Constant 
R2 (Corrected) 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
I 
.021* 
(.008) 
.240** 
(.049) 
2.300** 
(.464) 
2.037** 
(.324) 
2.146** 
(.662) 
.462 
.720 
II 
.221** 
(.046) 
2.531** 
(.441) 
1.917** 
(.295) 
2.350** 
(.614) 
.211** 
(.057) 
.501 
.757 
III 
.015 
(.009) 
.241** 
(.047) 
2.272** 
(.454) 
1.715** 
(.367) 
3.117** 
(.853) 
.097 
(.055) 
.445 
.732 
IV 
.021* 
(.009) 
.240** 
(.055) 
2.296** 
(.546) 
2.039** 
(.354) 
2.144** 
(.686) 
.004 
(.354) 
.463 
.713 
V 
.015 
(.009) 
.237** 
(.048) 
2.350** 
(.485) 
1.667** 
(.382) 
2.858** 
(1.011) 
.085 
(.060) 
.121 
(.042) 
.438 
.727 
VI 
.018 
(.010) 
.237** 
(.049) 
2.142** 
(.544) 
1.836** 
(.432) 
2.660* 
(1.041) 
.081 
(.061) 
.022 
(.042) 
.125 
(.147) 
.433 
.726 
VII 
.013 
(.009) 
.243** 
(.047) 
2.326** 
(.453) 
1.633** 
(.370) 
3.006** 
(.852) 
.084 
(.056) 
.070 
(.056) 
.434 
.736 
Several other variables are not significant in the net 
coverage analysis. The unemployment rate has essen-
tially no impact, supporting the previous interpreta-
tion that its importance in the group duplication 
equation was through duplicate phantom coverage, 
rather than real coverage. The market shares of Blue 
Cross and HMO's are positive and negative, respec-
tively, but neither approaches statistical significance. 
Unionization has a positive coefficient with a t-ratio of 
about 1.25. Contrasted with its powerful role in the 
gorup duplication equation, this suggests that unions 
may be more effective in obtaining comprehensive 
benefits for their members than in improving com-
munity coverage. 
A Synthetic Time Series of Net Coverage by State 
The first step in the estimating process involved 
using the coefficients from the net coverage equation 
for 1976 with the observed state values of the inde-
pendent variables for 1950,1960, and 1970. These 
data were derived from the decennial census and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (personal income data). 
The per capita income figures were adjusted to real 
values using the cross-sectional approach of Fuchs, 
Michael and Scott and the annual national consumer 
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price index. The net state coverage estimates for 
1950, 1960, 1970 and the 1976 SIE figures were used 
to interpolate values for intervening years for each 
state. The state estimates were weighted by popula-
tion under 65 to derive the coverage figures for each 
region and compared with the survey estimates in 
Table 5. 
At least for the period 1959-76, the process worked 
rather well. It tracked the increase in coverage na-
tionally from 69 percent to 78 percent of the popula-
tion and captured the clear differences in coverage 
between the Northeast and North Central regions on 
one hand and the South and West on the other. 
Sampling error and slight changes in questions from 
survey to survey can account for several point differ-
ences. While the procedure correctly reflected the re-
gional pattern of coverage in 1953, it substantially 
overestimated the overall levels, probably because 
the early 1950's were a period of major expansion in 
health insurance coverage and represented a different 
market situation. 
To provide the most accurate possible estimates of 
coverage, regional adjustment figures were calculated 
for each survey year. Thus, for 1974, the adjustment 
for the West was + 0.7. This adjustment was sub-
tracted from the first stage estimate for each state in 
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TABLE 5 
Actual and First Stage Synthetic Estimates of Net Coverage 
for the Population Under Age 65 by Region, 1953-1974 
Year 
1953-Survey1 
Estimate 
1959-Survey2 
Estimate 
1962-63-Survey3 
Estimate 
1968-Survey4 
Estimate 
1970-Survey5 
Estimate 
1972-Survey6 
Estimate 
1974-Survey6 
Estimate 
Northeast 
64.9 
74.6 
78.0 
76.6 
79.9 
78.6 
83.9 
81.5 
81.7 
82.7 
81.1 
82.2 
81.8 
81.8 
North Central 
67.0 
72.9 
76.0 
75.9 
78.3 
78.1 
84.2 
81.1 
84.0 
82.3 
82.1 
82.7 
83.6 
83.1 
South 
51.8 
66.1 
57.6 
67.8 
61.5 
70.1 
70.3 
73.3 
71.6 
74.7 
71.3 
74.4 
72.5 
74.0 
West 
48.9 
63.8 
63.8 
68.6 
68.0 
70.4 
74.7 
73.5 
73.6 
74.8 
71.9 
74.2 
73.0 
73.7 
U.S. Total 
59.4 
70.0 
69.2 
72.4 
71.9 
74.4 
78.2 
77.5 
77.8 
78.7 
76.7 
78.5 
77.8 
78.2 
SOURCES 
1Anderson, Odin W. and Jacob J. Feldman. Family Medical Costs and Voluntary Health Insurance: A Nation-
wide Survey. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. 
2Kovar, Mary Grace. Health Statistics from the U.S. National Health Survey, Series B, No. 26. "Interim Report 
on Health Insurance, United States, July-December 1959." Washington, D.C.: USGPO, December 1960. 
3U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital and Health Statistics, Series 10, No. 11. "Health Insurance 
Coverage, United States, July 1962-June 1963." August 1964. 
4U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital and Health Statistics, Series 10, No. 66. "Hospital and Sur-
gical Insurance Coverage, United States, 1968." Publication (PHS) 72-1033, 1972. 
5U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Monthly Vital Statistics Report. Vol. 21, No. 9. "Hospital and Sur-
gical Insurance Coverage Among Persons Under 65 Years of Age in the United States, 1970." Publication 
(HSM) 73-1128, 1972. 
6U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital and Health Statistics, Series 10, No. 117. "Hospital and Sur-
gical Insurance Coverage United States -1974." Publication (HRA) 77-1545,1977. 
NOTE: The 1953 survey of health insurance coverage does not provide estimates for the under 65 age 
population by region. Data are provided by region for coverage of all persons and national estimates are given 
for the over 64 and total populations. The ratio of the latter two numbers was applied to the regional figures to 
estimate the coverage rate for the over 64 population. Using the proportion of the population over 64 in each 
region with this estimated coverage rate and the known overall coverage rate, we estimated coverage for the 
under 65 age group. 
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that region. The weighted average of these revised 
state estimates now exactly equals the observed sur-
vey figure for that year. As a last step, the net cov-
erage figures for other years were calculated by inter-
polating between the revised state estimates for sur-
vey years. Thus, for each of the benchmark years, the 
weighted average of the net coverage figures for all 
the states in a region will exactly equal the observed 
regional coverage figure. Variations in coverage 
across states within a region reflect the underlying 
estimation process. These data for 1953-76 are pre-
sented in the appendix. 
Implications for Research 
The presence of duplicate coverage creates prob-
lems for research and analysis of health services 
utilization, which, if unheeded, can lead to substantial 
errors. For instance, suppose one knows that 25 per-
cent of the people with coverage X have duplicate 
coverage with carrier Y. To which carrier should their 
hospital use be attributed? How should a utilization 
rate be computed? How meaningful are such rates if 
people choose the plan they bill? Although most of 
the research problems occur when one is using 
aggregate data, the duplicate coverage issue also has 
implications for the analysis of behavior at an indi-
vidual level. While the analytic problems are im-
portant when people have two conventional plans, 
they are much more crucial to the analysis of HMO 
enrollees who also have conventional coverage. In 
such cases, out-of-plan use may be a meaningless 
concept. Moreover, the standard notion of primary in-
sured19 may be irrelevant because if HMOs and con-
ventional carriers do not coordinate benefits, the in-
sured have no reason to report duplicate coverage. 
Potential Problems Arising from the Use of HIAA 
Net Enrollment Figures 
Because they have been the only source of health 
insurance coverage at a state level, the HIAA net en-
rollment figures often have been used in cross-sec-
tional studies (Feldstein, 1971; Feldstein and Taylor, 
1977; Fuchs and Kramer, 1972; Goldberg and Green-
berg, 1977; Rosenthal, 1964). Given the rather low 
correlation between the HIAA and SIE figures, pre-
vious interpretations of the insurance coefficient 
might well be wrong. That is, the HIAA percent cov-
erage figures serve as very poor proxies for true cov-
erage rates by state. 
The inaccuracy in the HIAA figures has implica-
tions beyond confounding the insurance coefficient. 
If the HIAA coverage estimate was a poorly esti-
mated, but unbiased, approximation of the true value, 
then only its regression coefficient would be biased 
19Primary insured is the person whose employment is the 
source of coverage. 
toward zero. However, the error in HIAA figure due to 
duplicate coverage portion is strongly correlated with 
other variables that are important in utilization stud-
ies, such as income and unionization. This creates a 
classic "errors-in-variables problems" and suggests 
that the coefficients for other variables in the equa-
tion may also be biased. Unfortunately, the direction 
of the bias cannot be determined without knowing 
the partial correlations among the variables (Kmenta, 
1971). 
The Bias in Comparisons of Utilization by 
Insured Persons 
The difficulty with the HIAA data can be overcome 
by using the SIE figures for 1976 or, for other years, 
our synthetic estimates using the SIE coverage pat-
terns and other surveys as benchmarks. Such simple 
solutions are not applicable to certain other research 
areas. For instance, two potentially valuable sources 
of data are all Blue Cross enrollees and Federal em-
ployees choosing the Blue Cross option. Goldberg 
and Greenberg (1977, 1980) based their analyses of 
the HMO competitive effect on these data. Luft (1979) 
proposed a similar study including variations over 
time as well as across states. However, because of 
duplicate coverage, it is impossible to identify the ap-
propriate Blue Cross denominators and utilization 
rates are therefore undefined. 
There is a simple test of whether this is a real prob-
lem or just a potential but unimportant bias. The rate 
of hospital admissions varies markedly across the 
country, reflecting both supply and demand factors. 
We would expect such factors to have comparable 
impact on both the population in general and people 
with Blue Cross coverage. Although the two rates will 
not be identical, there is no reason to expect the 
duplicate coverage rate to have a negative effect on 
the true utilization rate of BC members. (One might 
even expect a positive relation, if duplicate coverage 
leads to hospitalization for profit.) We specify the 
equation in log form and, since the AHA admission 
rate includes people of all ages, include the percent 
of the state's population over 65 as well as the group 
duplication rate. 
BC-ADSgroup= .191 + .926AHA-ADS - .366 Duplicategroup + .472% >65 (.652) (.131) (.106) (.398) 
R2
 = .710 
standard error in parentheses 
The significant negative coefficient for the duplicate 
coverage rate suggests that carrier-based utilization 
data are, in fact, biased by duplicate coverage and 
that a 1 percent increase in duplicate coverage in a 
state reduces the reported Blue Cross admission by 
about 0.37 percent.20 
20Clearly, there are problems of endogeneity in this equa-
tion that preclude causal interpretation. It is merely pre-
sented as a demonstration that carrier-based utilization rates 
may be biased by duplicate coverage. 
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If it is reasonable to generalize this result, dupli-
cate coverage may invalidate studies using cross-sec-
tional comparisons of carrier-based data. The same 
threat to validity occurs in the analysis of plan-spe-
cific data over time. The increasing importance of 
duplicate coverage suggests that if the true admis-
sion rate for plan enrollees is constant, the measured 
rate will show a decline (Luft, 1981). An example may 
be instructive. The Hawaii Medical Service Associa-
tion, a Blue Shield plan, reports markedly declining 
utilization rates in the last 5 years. Yet, the hospital 
utilization data reported by the American Hospital 
Association show an increase. The high rate of dupli-
cate coverage and potential for enrollment in both 
HMSA and Kaiser may explain the discrepancy in 
these two trends.21 
With substantial but unknown levels of duplicate 
coverage among the enrollees of specific plans, it 
becomes difficult to evaluate innovations which are 
designed to reduce hospital admissions such as im-
proved ambulatory benefits, outpatient surgery and 
second opinions. Without accurate estimates of the 
denominator, changes in admission rates cannot be 
used to measure performance. 
Premium and Benefit Estimates 
Although the primary focus of this section is on the 
implications of duplicate coverage for estimates of 
utilization, there are also problems with premiums 
and benefit estimates. Fortunately, the published 
state HIAA financial data are not adjusted in the 
same manner as their coverage statistics, so they are 
comparable to the raw gross enrollment statistics. 
Whereas duplication results in double counting 
people in enrollment statistics, having two health in-
surance policies does not double one's benefits. Car-
riers attempt to coordinate benefits so that the total 
reimbursement does not exceed the expenses in-
21Hawaii has an exceptionally high proportion of multi-
earner families. HMSA strongly discourages duplicate cov-
erage under its own plan by paying only the benefits offered 
by the more comprehensive contract. This provides an incen-
tive for two worker families to choose a combination of 
Kaiser or a commercial carrier plus HMSA, rather than letting 
the fringe benefit be lost. 
curred. Furthermore, since most group policies are 
experience-rated, this coordination is eventually re-
flected in relatively lower premiums.22 
In some studies, a measure of benefits per insured 
person is used (see for example, Fuchs and Kramer, 
1972). Even if the total benefit measure is not far from 
the mark, a biased enrollment figure in the denomina-
tor will threaten the validity of such figures. More im-
portantly, one should probably distinguish popula-
tions that have moderate benefit levels resulting from 
uniform single policy coverage from those with the 
same average benefits resulting from a small fraction 
with multiple policies. The same problems occur in 
the analysis of premium per enrollee. 
Implications for Micro Studies 
Although this discussion has focused on analyses 
that utilize aggregate data for states or insurance 
plans, duplicate coverage also presents problems for 
researchers working with data at an individual level. 
Individuals are often used as the unit of observation 
in studies of hospital or ambulatory care use by HMO 
members, and well designed studies often attempt to 
measure out-of-plan use (Pope, Freeborn, and Green-
lick, 1972; Scitovsky, Benham, and McCall, 1981). 
But how is out-of-plan use defined when a person 
is covered by both an HMO and a conventional in-
surer such as Blue Cross? The HMO may be the pri-
mary source of care and the BC/BS coverage used for 
22The following regression offers some insight into the role 
of group and non-group policies in the benefit-to-premium 
ratio: 
BENFT/PREM= .815 + .014 GRPDPRT - .174 INDVDRT 
(.052) (.043) (.069) 
+ .110 PCTBCGRP - .011 PCTBCNGP 
(.046) (.039) 
R2 = .372 
standard error in parentheses 
Non-group policies are significantly related to lower payout 
ratios and the Blue Cross market share of group policies, 
PCTBCGP, is reflected in higher payout rates. The group 
duplication rate, GRPDPRT, is positive and not significant. 
This suggests that the effects of increasing duplication on 
benefits per enrollee are reflected in premiums per enrollee. 
A potential factor which may explain the positive coefficient 
is the possibility that duplication is more common for en-
rollees of large firms and such firms have lower administra-
tive load factors per employee. 
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second opinions or an occasional "convenience 
visit." Alternatively, a person may have a long stand-
ing pattern of using the HMO for certain types of 
visits such as preventive checkups or pediatric care 
and fee-for-service providers for others. Finally, the 
HMO may be used just as a backup provider.23 Here 
the usual definition of out-of-plan use may be mean-
ingless. The issue is further complicated because 
people can use their multiple coverages in ways that 
have nothing to do with whose employer provides the 
coverage. That is, subscriber vs. dependent status 
may be irrelevant. 
While the effective cost of insurance, the ratio of 
premiums to benefits, may influence the purchase of 
non-group coverage, it probably has little impact on 
employer decisions for coverage. Employers shop for 
carriers with low premium/benefit ratios for specific 
types of coverage, but the popularity of first dollar 
coverage, prescription drug coverage, and other fea-
tures with high administrative costs suggests that 
factors other than just premium loading may influ-
ence the choice of plan. Furthermore, since few em-
ployees have the option of converting unwanted 
duplicate coverage into other fringe benefits, the ex-
tent of duplicate coverage is largely involuntary. A 
small number of people may choose their employers 
based on health insurance packages, but to the ex-
tent this occurs, it probably reflects people who face 
the choice of group vs. nongroup coverage. Thus, fu-
ture studies of health insurance coverage should 
focus on the role of occupation in determining the ex-
tent of coverage of each family member, through 
whom such coverage is obtained, and why. (See, for 
example, Phelps, 1976, and the National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey, 1980.) 
Implications for Policy 
Many of the data problems raised in the preceding 
section will have an indirect impact on policy by al-
tering the conclusions of studies that shape our per-
ception of the medical care system. However, dupli-
cate coverage also has direct implications for several 
policy areas: (1) alternative tax treatment of group 
health insurance and the ability of employees to re-
allocate fringe benefits; (2) the geographic disparities 
in duplicate coverage and the transfers implicit in 
different forms of national health insurance financing; 
and (3) the impact of duplicate coverage on health in-
surance premiums. 
23For example, the University of California offers its em-
ployees in Northern California fully paid Kaiser coverage for 
families while BC/BS coverage costs an additional $550 per 
year. A reasonably healthy family planning to use fee-for-
service practitioners for routine ambulatory care would be 
better off choosing Kaiser rather than BC/BS, even if Kaiser 
is used only for major expenses. If a second family member 
has access to less expensive BC/BS coverage, then the ob-
vious choice is Kaiser plus BC/BS duplicate coverage. 
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Fringe Benefit Flexibility 
Both the rise in labor force participation of married 
women and expansion in fringe benefits provided by 
employers suggest that duplicate coverage will be 
growing. When employees do not have the option of 
allocating their employer contribution for other 
things, such as retirement benefits, dental insurance, 
or even taxable income, the result is often unwanted 
and unnecessary duplicate health insurance cov-
erage. With experience-rated premiums, the lower 
claims-paid cost that occurs when people have dupli-
cate coverage will reduce the average cost. This re-
sults in an indirect income transfer from multi to 
single earner families. In an era when the take-home 
pay of many working wives barely covers child care 
expenses, it seems absurd to effectively forego em-
ployer health insurance contributions that may be 
equivalent to over $1000 per year in tax-free income. 
A strong case is being made by some to place ceil-
ings on tax exempt employer contributions to encour-
age the choice of less expensive health plans. (See 
proposals such as those introduced by Senators 
Durenberger, Health Incentive Reform Act of 1979 (S. 
1968), and Schweiker, Comprehensive Health Care Re-
form Act (S. 1590), or Representatives Ullman, Health 
Cost Restraint Act of 1979 (H.R. 5740), and Gephardt 
and Stockman, National Health Care Reform Act (H.R. 
7527). These proposals are generally based upon the 
Consumer Choice Health Plan (Enthoven, 1978)). An 
important component of such policy changes should 
be encouragement for employees to decline health in-
surance coverage from one employer if already cov-
ered through another family member. However, the 
worker should be able to direct the employer's 
contribution for health insurance to some other bene-
fit. To make such a system attractive, the employee 
who chooses to be covered by his or her spouse 
must be allowed to reenter the plan without proof of 
insurability if the spouse loses his or her coverage. 
Although the duplicate coverage issue is an impor-
tant factor in the current system, it becomes even 
more crucial in the context of National Health In-
surance proposals that rely on mandated employer-
based financing. One of the problems faced by em-
ployer-based coverage is the possibility that it will re-
quire such a substantial expansion of fringe benefits 
for part-time and low-paid workers that firms will elim-
inate those positions. If such positions are filled pri-
marily by second or third workers in a family, the abil-
ity to decline health insurance coverage, especially if 
the person has coverage through other family mem-
bers, may have a substantial beneficial effect on em-
ployment options. Hawaii's compulsory health insur-
ance law exempts employees who work less than 20 
hours per week. If someone works for more than one 
employer, the one who pays the most wages is con-
sidered the primary employer and is responsible for 
providing coverage (Skolnik, 1975). A possible better 
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alternative might allow workers to pool the fringe 
benefits of the family's multiple employers to buy a 
single, more comprehensive health insurance pack-
age. A ceiling on the tax deductibility of employer 
contributions may also make complementary 
coverage through multiple employers more attractive. 
While it may be administratively impossible to design 
such complementary policies, large insurers, such as 
Blue Cross, might offer to provide complementarity if 
both spouses have Blue Cross coverage, e.g., two low 
option Blue Cross family plans may be traded for one 
high option family coverage plan. 
Transfers Resulting from Duplicate Coverage 
Health insurance is designed to spread the risk of 
medical care expenses among a large group of 
people, all of whom are expected to benefit similarly 
from such sharing. Once a person has reasonably 
complete coverage through one policy, additional 
policies offer little additional benefit because in-
surers and employers do not usually offer "comple-
mentary packages," such as a "well baby visit" or 
"prescription drug" package to fill in the gaps left by 
the primary policy. Thus, people with duplicate group 
coverage will use less than their actuarial share of 
services and are effectively subsidizing the others in 
their group who do not have duplicate policies. In an 
analogous fashion, those employee groups with a 
high proportion of duplicate coverage (say, because a 
high proportion of the employees' spouses are work-
ing and have coverage) can have a broader benefit 
package for the same fringe benefit contribution. 
National Health Insurance proposals that rely on 
employer contributions for financing will reinforce 
this tendency. If risks and costs are pooled national-
ly, then areas with extensive duplicate coverage, such 
as the industrial Northeast and Midwest will subsi-
dize the rest of the country. On the other hand, if 
benefits and premiums are allowed to vary by area, 
then these industrialized areas will be able to afford 
extra benefits at lower per capita cost. Industrywide 
increases in fringe benefits in those industries whose 
products have relatively inelastic demand curves will 
shift the costs of such benefits forward to con-
sumers. The changes in benefit patterns will be in-
fluenced by the duplicate coverage levels existing in 
the industry and the ground rules set for benefit 
packages, premium determination, and fringe benefit 
flexibility. 
Insurance Rates 
Many states regulate the premiums charged by 
health insurance carriers for non-group policies. For 
group policies, premiums often are based on prior 
cost or benefit experience. In each case, the costs 
that influence future premium levels include benefits 
paid to subscribers or providers and administrative 
expense. The vigor of carrier attempts to control both 
types of costs may reflect, in part, the degree to 
which their costs exceed or fall short of projections. 
(This perspective reflects a satisficing model of be-
havior rather than an optimizing model. (See Simon, 
1959). While a satisficing model may be applicable to 
the entire industry, its relevance is heightened by the 
dominant role played by the not-for-profit Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield plans.) 
As duplicate coverage increases, premiums based 
on historic utilization patterns will exceed realized 
costs because an increasing fraction of the plan's en-
rollees will charge their costs to another carrier (Luft, 
1981). This will generate a tendency towards slack, 
rather than tightness in the budgetary process, and 
may reduce the incentives for the organization to ini-
tiate aggressive cost containment efforts. As pre-
viously mentioned, many cost containment strategies, 
such as outpatient surgery, second surgical opinions, 
and ambulatory benefits, may be evaluated incorrectly 
because duplicate coverage trends bias the plan's 
data. 
Although duplicate health insurance coverage has 
long been recognized by the industry, it has attracted 
little attention from either researchers or policy mak-
ers. Yet, it is far more important than might be dis-
cerned from technical discussions of the differences 
between national estimates of the population with 
coverage based on survey vs. enrollment data. 
Duplication through group and non-group policies is 
substantial, growing, and varies markedly across 
states, industries, and family situations. Relatively 
simple regression models can explain a substantial 
fraction of this variation across states and subse-
quent research will surely be able to improve our un-
derstanding of the reasons for duplicate coverage. 
The available data already allow us to question earlier 
studies of the medical care system that relied upon 
invalid estimates of health insurance coverage and 
should warn future researchers to be more cautious 
of their data. Recognizing the importance of duplicate 
coverage also allows us to reassess proposals con-
cerning employer contributions for health insurance 
and to suggest modifications. Simply adding the 
duplicate coverage issue to the agenda should im-
prove the policy making process. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Revised Estimates of Net Health Insurance Coverage for the Population Under 65 
1953-1976 
State 
AL 
A K 
AR 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
G A 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
VT 
DMV 
1953 
0.556878 
0.515675 
0.481440 
0.495011 
0.483501 
0.667552 
0.576174 
0.457142 
0.552045 
0.501661 
0.692510 
0.675100 
0.642405 
0.585658 
0.492168 
0.500368 
0.590979 
0.664982 
0.689011 
0.653573 
0.532774 
0.651750 
0.507268 
0.613933 
0.478103 
0.624109 
0.639094 
0.366969 
0.651053 
0.554525 
0.614536 
0.681225 
0.469915 
0.524181 
0.646917 
0.645685 
0.569163 
0.592236 
0.521119 
0.485760 
0.533049 
0.466800 
0.533955 
0.688202 
0.466548 
0.604671 
0.530105 
1954 
0.563856 
0.526595 
0.503742 
0.519253 
0.509945 
0.689585 
0.584709 
0.466677 
0.560917 
0.525449 
0.707465 
0.690619 
0.659498 
0.603445 
0.501092 
0.509049 
0.613246 
0.688209 
0.703189 
0.669958 
0.540439 
0.664621 
0.531602 
0.629206 
0.501704 
0.648729 
0.661077 
0.383965 
0.672258 
0.563791 
0.630184 
0.695478 
0.483011 
0.550555 
0.668891 
0.665686 
0.572530 
0.606607 
0.531972 
0.499089 
0.560567 
0.496021 
0.541465 
0.702914 
0.493815 
0.630781 
0.541183 
1955 
0.570834 
0.537514 
0.526043 
0.543495 
0.536389 
0.711619 
0.593244 
0.476211 
0.569789 
0.549238 
0.722421 
0.706138 
0.676591 
0.621232 
0.510016 
0.517730 
0.635512 
0.711536 
0.717368 
0.686343 
0.548103 
0.677489 
0.555935 
0.644479 
0.525304 
0.673350 
0.683061 
0.400961 
0.693464 
0.573057 
0.645831 
0.709730 
0.496107 
0.576928 
0.690866 
0.685687 
0.575897 
0.620979 
0.542825 
0.512417 
0.588085 
0.525243 
0.548974 
0.717625 
0.521082 
0.656892 
0.552261 
1956 
0.577812 
0.548433 
0.548345 
0.567737 
0.562833 
0.733653 
0.601779 
0.485746 
0.578661 
0.573027 
0.737377 
0.721657 
0.693684 
0.639019 
0.518940 
0.526410 
0.657779 
0.734864 
0.731547 
0.702727 
0.555767 
0.690358 
0.580269 
0.659752 
0.548904 
0.697971 
0.705045 
0.417956 
0.714669 
0.582323 
0.661478 
0.723983 
0.509204 
0.603302 
0.712841 
0.705687 
0.579265 
0.635350 
0.553678 
0.525746 
0.615603 
0.554464 
0.556484 
0.732337 
0.548350 
0.683002 
0.563340 
1957 
0.584790 
0.559353 
0.570646 
0.591979 
0.589277 
0.755687 
0.610314 
0.495280 
0.587532 
0.596816 
0.752333 
0.737177 
0.710776 
0.656806 
0.527864 
0.535091 
0.680046 
0.758191 
0.745725 
0.719112 
0.563432 
0.703226 
0.604602 
0.675024 
0.572505 
0.722592 
0.727029 
0.434952 
0.735875 
0.591589 
0.677125 
0.738236 
0.522300 
0.629675 
0.734816 
0.725688 
0.582632 
0.649721 
0.564532 
0.539075 
0.643120 
0.583686 
0.563994 
0.747048 
0.575617 
0.709112 
0.574418 
1958 
0.591768 
0.570272 
0.592947 
0.616221 
0.615722 
0.777720 
0.618849 
0.504815 
0.596404 
0.620604 
0.767288 
0.752696 
0.727869 
0.674593 
0.536788 
0.543772 
0.702313 
0.781519 
0.759904 
0.735497 
0.571096 
0.716094 
0.628935 
0.690297 
0.596105 
0.747213 
0.749013 
0.451948 
0.757080 
0.600855 
0.692772 
0.752489 
0.535396 
0.656049 
0.756790 
0.745689 
0.585999 
0.664093 
0.575385 
0.552404 
0.670638 
0.612907 
0.571504 
0.761760 
0.602884 
0.735222 
0.585496 
1959 
0.598746 
0.581191 
0.615249 
0.640463 
0.642166 
0.799754 
0.627384 
0.514349 
0.605276 
0.644393 
0.782244 
0.768215 
0.744962 
0.692380 
0.545712 
0.552453 
0.724579 
0.804846 
0.774093 
0.751881 
0.578760 
0.728962 
0.653269 
0.705570 
0.619706 
0.771834 
0.770996 
0.468944 
0.778286 
0.610121 
0.708419 
0.766741 
0.548493 
0.682422 
0.778765 
0.765690 
0.589366 
0.678464 
0.586238 
0.565733 
0.698156 
0.642129 
0.579013 
0.776471 
0.630152 
0.761333 
0.596574 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/JUNE 1982/Volume 3, Number 4 63 
APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd.) 
State 
AL 
AK 
AR 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
VT 
DMV 
1960 
0.604957 
. 
0.591921 
0.627560 
0.652645 
0.653375 
0.805343 
0.638308 
0.533380 
0.613841 
. 
0.655153 
0.786054 
0.773296 
0.751447 
0.700027 
0.556885 
0.560941 
0.729624 
0.812361 
0.780626 
0.758253 
0.588042 
0.734574 
0.666126 
0.712554 
0.633390 
0.779344 
0.775406 
0.484932 
0.782488 
0.617801 
0.711774 
0.773286 
0.560285 
0.695704 
0.782962 
0.769902 
0.595695 
0.685119 
0.599345 
0.575290 
0.709023 
0.654027 
0.586724 
0.782345 
0.640379 
0.766124 
0.603516 
1961 
0.611168 
. 
0.602652 
0.639871 
0.664828 
0.664583 
0.810932 
0.649232 
0.552411 
0.622406 
. 
0.665914 
0.789865 
0.778377 
0.757931 
0.707673 
0.568057 
0.569430 
0.734609 
0.819877 
0.787170 
0.764624 
0.597324 
0.740186 
0.678984 
0.719538 
0.647073 
0.786854 
0.779815 
0.500919 
0.786691 
0.625482 
0.715129 
0.779831 
0.572077 
0.708985 
0.787160 
0.774114 
0.602024 
0.691775 
0.612452 
0.584847 
0.719890 
0.665926 
0.594435 
0.788219 
0.650606 
0.770915 
0.610458 
1962 
0.617379 
. 
0.613382 
0.652182 
0.677010 
0.675792 
0.816520 
0.660156 
0.571442 
0.630971 
. 
0.676674 
0.793675 
0.783458 
0.764416 
0.715320 
0.579230 
0.577918 
0.739713 
0.827392 
0.793713 
0.770995 
0.606605 
0.745798 
0.691841 
0.726523 
0.660757 
0.794365 
0.784225 
0.516907 
0.790893 
0.633162 
0.718485 
0.786376 
0.583869 
0.722266 
0.791357 
0.778327 
0.608353 
0.698430 
0.625559 
0.594405 
0.730757 
0.677824 
0.602146 
0.794093 
0.660833 
0.775706 
0.617400 
1963 
0.623591 
0.296238 
0.624112 
0.664493 
0.689193 
0.687001 
0.822109 
0.671080 
0.590473 
0.639536 
0.531407 
0.687434 
0.797486 
0.788540 
0.770900 
0.722966 
0.590402 
0.586406 
0.744758 
0.834907 
0.800257 
0.777366 
0.615887 
0.751409 
0.704699 
0.733507 
0.674441 
0.801875 
0.788635 
0.532895 
0.795096 
0.640842 
0.721840 
0.792921 
0.595662 
0.735548 
0.795554 
0.782539 
0.614682 
0.705085 
0.638666 
0.603962 
0.741624 
0.689723 
0.609857 
0.799967 
0.671060 
0.780497 
0.624342 
1964 
0.637386 
0.314214 
0.642618 
0.678492 
0.702374 
0.698149 
0.831161 
0.690640 
0.620510 
0.655838 
0.555719 
0.698870 
0.806586 
0.799146 
0.782854 
0.736238 
0.610164 
0.602670 
0.753007 
0.846097 
0.813261 
0.789405 
0.633547 
0.763607 
0.718750 
0.746734 
0.689838 
0.812627 
0.796131 
0.553565 
0.802575 
0.655833 
0.730103 
0.805901 
0.614859 
0.749484 
0.802771 
0.790433 
0.629838 
0.718173 
0.660364 
0.620102 
0.751959 
0.700865 
0.625475 
0.811900 
0.680626 
0.787126 
0.637745 
1965 
0.651181 
0.332190 
0.661125 
0.692491 
0.715555 
0.709298 
0.840213 
0.710201 
0.650546 
0.672141 
0.580032 
0.710306 
0.815686 
0.809753 
0.794807 
0.749509 
0.629926 
0.618934 
0.761255 
0.857286 
0.826264 
0.801443 
0.651208 
0.775805 
0.732800 
0.759960 
0.705235 
0.823379 
0.803627 
0.574235 
0.810055 
0.670825 
0.738366 
0.818882 
0.634056 
0.763419 
0.809987 
0.798328 
0.644994 
0.731262 
0.682062 
0.636241 
0.762294 
0.712007 
0.641092 
0.823832 
0.690191 
0.793756 
0.651148 
1966 
0.664977 
0.350166 
0.679632 
0.706490 
0.728736 
0.720447 
0.849264 
0.729761 
0.680583 
0.688443 
0.604344 
0.721742 
0.824787 
0.820360 
0.806761 
0.762780 
0.649687 
0.635199 
0.769504 
0.868476 
0.839268 
0.813482 
0.668868 
0.788003 
0.746851 
0.773187 
0.720632 
0.834130 
0.811123 
0.594905 
0.817535 
0.685816 
0.746629 
0.831863 
0.653254 
0.777355 
0.817203 
0.806222 
0.660150 
0.744350 
0.703761 
0.652381 
0.772629 
0.723150 
0.656710 
0.835765 
0.699757 
0.800385 
0.664551 
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State 
AL 
AK 
AR 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
MO 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
VT 
DMV 
1967 
0.678772 
0.368142 
0.698139 
0.720490 
0.741917 
0.731596 
0.858316 
0.749321 
0.710619 
0.704745 
0.628657 
0.733178 
0.833887 
0.830967 
0.818715 
0.776052 
0.669449 
0.651463 
0.777753 
0.879666 
0.852271 
0.825520 
0.686529 
0.800201 
0.760901 
0.786413 
0.736029 
0.844882 
0.818620 
0.615575 
0.825014 
0.700808 
0.754892 
0.844843 
0.672451 
0.791291 
0.824420 
0.814117 
0.675306 
0.757438 
0.725459 
0.668521 
0.782964 
0.734292 
0.672328 
0.847698 
0.709322 
0.807014 
0.677954 
1968 
0.692567 
0.386118 
0.716645 
0.734489 
0.755098 
0.742744 
0.867368 
0.768881 
0.740656 
0.721048 
0.652969 
0.744614 
0.842987 
0.841573 
0.830668 
0.789323 
0.689211 
0.667727 
0.786002 
0.890855 
0.865275 
0.837559 
0.704189 
0.812399 
0.774952 
0.799640 
0.751426 
0.855634 
0.826116 
0.636245 
0.832494 
0.715799 
0.763155 
0.857824 
0.691648 
0.805227 
0.831636 
0.822011 
0.690462 
0.770526 
0.747157 
0.684661 
0.793299 
0.745435 
0.687946 
0.859631 
0.718888 
0.813644 
0.691357 
1969 
0.695053 
0.385255 
0.723842 
0.729648 
0.749439 
0.735053 
0.857260 
0.777131 
0.759382 
0.726040 
0.658441 
0.737209 
0.839278 
0.839370 
0.829812 
0.789785 
0.697663 
0.672681 
0.775090 
0.882885 
0.865469 
0.836787 
0.710540 
0.811787 
0.770163 
0.800057 
0.747983 
0.847225 
0.814452 
0.638075 
0.820814 
0.719480 
0.758608 
0.857994 
0.699536 
0.800323 
0.819692 
0.810745 
0.694308 
0.770805 
0.757545 
0.689490 
0.784794 
0.737737 
0.692254 
0.858754 
0.709613 
0.801113 
0.693451 
1970 
0.697538 
0.384391 
0.731039 
0.724807 
0.743780 
0.727362 
0.847152 
0.785381 
0.778109 
0.731032 
0.663914 
0.729805 
0.835568 
0.837167 
0.828955 
0.790246 
0.706114 
0.677635 
0.764179 
0.874914 
0.865662 
0.836016 
0.716890 
0.811175 
0.765373 
0.800473 
0.744540 
0.838817 
0.802789 
0.639905 
0.809133 
0.723162 
0.754061 
0.858165 
0.707423 
0.795418 
0.807748 
0.799480 
0.698154 
0.771083 
0.767933 
0.694320 
0.776289 
0.730040 
0.696561 
0.857877 
0.700339 
0.788583 
0.695544 
1971 
0.704203 
0.413336 
0.722926 
0.715507 
0.732022 
0.728247 
0.848245 
0.785772 
0.769193 
0.727694 
0.664878 
0.726579 
0.821208 
0.832555 
0.828154 
0.786936 
0.706670 
0.674463 
0.763827 
0.865396 
0.853855 
0.828725 
0.706502 
0.798015 
0.758258 
0.798341 
0.738398 
0.833553 
0.806106 
0.629852 
0.802624 
0.727729 
0.751105 
0.847136 
0.704158 
0.784410 
0.807877 
0.799554 
0.700204 
0.766275 
0.763276 
0.689007 
0.778360 
0.725955 
0.705016 
0.852544 
0.702806 
0.786091 
0.699534 
1972 
0.710868 
0.442281 
0.714813 
0.706208 
0.720263 
0.729132 
0.849338 
0.786162 
0.760278 
0.724356 
0.665842 
0.723353 
0.806848 
0.827942 
0.827353 
0.783626 
0.707225 
0.671292 
0.763474 
0.855878 
0.842048 
0.821433 
0.696113 
0.784855 
0.751142 
0.796208 
0.732255 
0.828289 
0.809422 
0.619800 
0.796114 
0.732297 
0.748148 
0.836108 
0.700893 
0.773402 
0.808006 
0.799628 
0.702254 
0.761466 
0.758620 
0.683695 
0.780432 
0.721870 
0.713471 
0.847211 
0.705274 
0.783600 
0.703525 
1973 
0.725133 
0.485076 
0.714300 
0.710758 
0.722354 
0.743867 
0.856931 
0.794153 
0.758962 
0.728617 
0.680656 
0.733977 
0.809488 
0.840330 
0.843551 
0.797317 
0.715381 
0.675721 
0.769622 
0.852860 
0.847241 
0.831142 
0.693324 
0.788695 
0.757876 
0.811076 
0.739963 
0.829524 
0.819239 
0.623597 
0.796104 
0.744465 
0.752191 
0.842079 
0.705227 
0.776244 
0.814635 
0.806202 
0.711903 
0.773658 
0.761563 
0.685982 
0.796353 
0.731635 
0.729525 
0.858878 
0.721592 
0.787609 
0.715116 
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State 
AL 
AK 
AR 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
ID 
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MA 
Ml 
MN 
MS 
MO 
MT 
NE 
NV 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NY 
NC 
ND 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
Rl 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
WA 
WV 
WI 
WY 
VT 
DMV 
1974 
0.739398 
0.527871 
0.713787 
0.715308 
0.724445 
0.758602 
0.864524 
0.802144 
0.757647 
0.732879 
0.695470 
0.744601 
0.812127 
0.852718 
0.859750 
0.811007 
0.723536 
0.680149 
0.775770 
0.849842 
0.852434 
0.840851 
0.690535 
0.792535 
0.764610 
0.825943 
0.747671 
0.830760 
0.829056 
0.627394 
0.796094 
0.756632 
0.776234 
0.848051 
0.709562 
0.779087 
0.821264 
0.812776 
0.721553 
0.785850 
0.764506 
0.688270 
0.812274 
0.741400 
0.745580 
0.870545 
0.737909 
0.791618 
0.726707 
1975 
0.753663 
0.570666 
0.713274 
0.719858 
0.726537 
0.773336 
0.872116 
0.810134 
0.756331 
0.737141 
0.710284 
0.755225 
0.814767 
0.865106 
0.875949 
0.824697 
0.731692 
0.684578 
0.781918 
0.846823 
0.857627 
0.850560 
0.687747 
0.796375 
0.771345 
0.840811 
0.755379 
0.831996 
0.838873 
0.631191 
0.796084 
0.768800 
0.790278 
0.854022 
0.713897 
0.781929 
0.827893 
0.819350 
0.731203 
0.798042 
0.767450 
0.690557 
0.828195 
0.751165 
0.761635 
0.882212 
0.754227 
0.795627 
0.738298 
1976 
0.767928 
0.613461 
0.712761 
0.724409 
0.728628 
0.788071 
0.879709 
0.818125 
0.755016 
0.741402 
0.725098 
0.765849 
0.817407 
0.877493 
0.892147 
0.838388 
0.739847 
0.689007 
0.788065 
0.843805 
0.862820 
0.850268 
0.684958 
0.800215 
0.778079 
0.855679 
0.763087 
0.833232 
0.848690 
0.634989 
0.796074 
0.780968 
0.804321 
0.859994 
0.718232 
0.784771 
0.834522 
0.825924 
0.740853 
0.810233 
0.770393 
0.692844 
0.844116 
0.760931 
0.777689 
0.893879 
0.770545 
0.799636 
0.749889 
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